Don L. Hammond v. Laroy Orr : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Don L. Hammond v. Laroy Orr : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan R. Farris; Mangum & Associates; Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.
David J. Hodgson; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hammond v. Orr, No. 20011032 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3625
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON L. HAMMOND, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs, 
LAROY ORR, ) 
Defendant-Appellee, 
Case No. 20011032-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE 
Bryan R. Farris 
MANGUM & ASSOCIATES, 
1438 East 820 North 
Orem, Utah 84097 
L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
David J. Hodgson 
954 East 7145 South, Suite B-205 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Jourt of A^rc.^s 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
JUL-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON L. HAMMOND, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
LAROY ORR, ) 
Defendant-Appellee, 
Case No, 20011032-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE 
Bryan R. Farris 
MANGUM & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
1438 East 820 North 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
David J. Hodgson 
954 East 7145 South, Suite B-205 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities 2 
Statement of Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings 3 
Statement of Issue Presented for Review 3 
kpplicab] e Standard of Revi ew 3 
Applicable Statutory Provisions 4 
Statement of the Case 4 
Summa i y «'> I Ar g ume n t 6 
Argument 6 
Conclusion 
Table of Authorities 
Statutes: 
11 U.S.C. §523(a) (3) 
Bankruptcy Rule 1007 
Cases: 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994) 
In re Herbyfs Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 130 (5th Cir.1993). 
Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1964) 
Birkett 
Milando 
In re Blossom, 57 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr. N.Ohio 1986) 
In re Gray, 57 B.R. 927, 931 (Bankr. R.I. 1986), aff'd, 60 B.R. 
428 (D.R.I. 1986). 
In re Robertson, 13 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. E.Va. 1981) 
Matter of Frankina, 29 B.R. 983, 985 (Bankr. E.Mich. 1983). 
Stark v. St. MaryTs Hospital, 717 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1983) 
In re Beshensky, 68 B.R. 452, 454 (Bktcy. E.D. Wis. 1987) 
Samuel v. Baitcher, 781 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) -
In re Bulbin, 122 Bankr. 161, 161 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); 
In re Hunter, 116 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990). 
Soult, 894 F.2d at 817; [**16] 
Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534 
Rosinski, 759 F.2d at 541 
In re Haga, 131 Bankr. 320, 326 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991) 
In re Anderson, 72 Bankr. 783, 786 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987) 
2 
Statement of Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This Appeal is from the order of the Third 
District Court entered on November 15, 2001 dismissing this 
matter without prejudice. 
Statement of Issue Presented for Review 
Whether Defendant's debt to Plaintiff should be discharged in 
bankruptcy when Defendant listed Plaintiff in the bankruptcy 
filings with the last known address for Defendant and Plaintiff 
had moved from that address after the agreement upon which the 
debt was based was had matured. 
Applicable Standard of Review 
The trial court's ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss is a 
matter of law and conclusions of law are reviewable for 
correctness and are given no special deference on appeal. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994) 
The primary issue in this case, the proper construction and 
application of section 523(a)(3)(A), is a question of law which 
this court reviews de novo. In re Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 
128, 130 (5th Cir.1993). 
1 
Applicable Statutory Provisions 
The pertinent section of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is 
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3). 
"A discharge under section 727 ... does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt. ... neither listed nor scheduled 
under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to 
the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to 
permit ... timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such 
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for 
such timely filing ... " 
Statement of the Case 
1. On November 3, 1992 Mr. Hammond and Mr. Orr entered 
into an agreement. The basic terms of the agreement 
were that Mr. Hammond loaned money to Mr. Orr subject 
to certain terms and conditions. This agreement was 
consummated in the exchange of the money and Mr. Orr's 
signature on a piece of scratch paper. 
2. At the time in which the agreement was made and during 
the time in which the agreement was in effect Mr. 
Hammond lived at the only address known to Mr. Orr. 
3. The debt to Mr. Hammond became due and payable on or 
about February 1993. Mr. Hammond never approached Mr. 
Orr after the debt became past due. 
4. After the debt was past due and after all contact had 
ceased with Mr. Orr, Mr. Hammond moved from the 
address that was known to Mr. Orr. Mr. Hammond never 
A 
notified Mr. Orr of the move or contacted Mr. Orr in 
any manner in regards to the debt. 
5. On December 30, 1994 Mr. Orr initiated bankruptcy 
proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of 
Utah, Case No. 94-26514. 
6. Mr. Hammond was listed in the bankruptcy filing 
schedules at the address where he had resided while 
the debt was outstanding and where Mr. Hammond was 
living at the last contact with Mr. Orr. 
7. On April 17, 1995 Mr. Orr was granted a discharge in 
his bankruptcy proceedings. 
8. On or before November 3, 1998 Mr. Hammond came to the 
knowledge that Mr. Orr had filed for bankruptcy 
through researching on the Internet. 
9. On November 4, 1998 Mr. Hammond filed this action. 
10. On or about November 18, 1999 Mr. Orr filed a 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay under U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code in the Utah District Court matter. The motion 
was based upon the grounds that Mr. Orr had filed a 
bankruptcy and that bankruptcy was discharged. The 
motion was also based on the fact that Mr. Hammond had 
been listed in the bankruptcy schedules. 
11. Mr. Orr's motion was granted and the order 
dismissing this action was entered on November 15, 
2001. 
12. Mr. Hammond has subsequently filed this appeal. 
Summary of Argument 
Despite the fact that Mr. Hammond was not provided notice of the 
bankruptcy proceeding his claim was not prejudiced in anyway and 
would have been dischargeable in the bankruptcy. Mr. Orr' s 
listing of Mr. Hammond at the last known address was reasonable 
and was done in good faith. 
Argument 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the law in Robinson v. 
Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1964) focusing upon the equitable 
powers of the bankruptcy court. The Court rejected other 
decisions, which had held that debtors were absolutely barred 
from amending their schedules after the proof-of-claim period. 
Id. at 549. Unlike Birkett and Milando, which strictly construed 
§523 (a) (3) against the debtor, the Robinson Court determined that 
out-of-time amendments would be allowed--but only if exceptional 
circumstances and equity so required. Id. at 550. 
The trial court in the instant case correctly applied the test to 
determine if a debt is excepted from discharge under Section 
523(a)(3). However, there is no requirement that a debtor must 
act in bad faith in not properly listing a particular debt for a 
debt to be excepted from discharge. See In re Blossom, 57 B.R. 
285, 287 (Bankr. N.Ohio 1986); In re Gray, 57 B.R. 927, 931 
(Bankr. R.I. 1986), aff?d, 60 B.R. 428 (D.R.I. 1986). 
The test is whether this debt was scheduled in time to permit a 
timely request for a determination of discharge or a timely proof 
of claim. Section 523(a)(3)(A) and (B) . In order for a debt to 
be duly listed, the debtor must state the name and address of the 
creditor. Bankruptcy Rule 1007. The burden is on the debtors to 
use reasonable diligence in completing their schedules and lists. 
In re Robertson, 13 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. E.Va. 1981). See also 
In re Blossom, supra, 57 B.R. at 287; In re Gray, supra, 57 B.R. 
at 930. If a creditor proves that an address is incorrect, the 
debtor must justify the inaccuracy in preparing his schedules. 
Matter of Robertson, supra, 13 B.R. at 731. An incorrect or 
careless omission is not enough. 13 B.R. at 731. 
Due process of law mandates notice is given to a creditor whose 
property rights are being affected so that he may have his day in 
court. Matter of Frankina, 29 B.R. 983, 985 (Bankr. E.Mich. 
1983) . 
Section 523(a)(3) is designed to remedy the harm to creditors 
that results from not being able to participate in the bankruptcy 
case. See Stark v. St. Mary's Hospital, 717 F.2d 322, 324 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that the right of the 
creditor that is protected by section 523(a)(3)(A) is the right 
to timely file a proof of claim); In re Beshensky, 68 B.R. 452, 
454 (Bktcy. E.D. Wis. 1987) (the key inquiry should be whether 
the creditor has been harmed by being excluded from the schedules 
and whether or not the omission was due to fraud or intentional 
design). The "harm" caused by not receiving notice of the 
bankruptcy filing may involve several different aspects depending 
on the particular case. Creditors are denied the opportunity to: 
(1) participate in the election of a trustee, (2) ask questions 
of the debtor at the meeting of creditors, (3) object to the 
debtor's claims of exempt property, (4) timely file a complaint 
objecting to discharge, (5) timely file a proof of claim and 
participate in any distribution, and (6) timely file a complaint 
to determine whether a debt is dischargeable under §523(a) (2), 
(4) or (6). It is important to note that the plain language of 
§523 (a) (3) only incorporates the last two aspects of possible 
harm as grounds for finding the debt nondischargeable. For 
whatever reason, Congress chose not to provide a remedy for 
creditors whose only loss was the opportunity to elect a trustee, 
question the debtor at the meeting of creditors, object to the 
debtor's claims of exempt property or object to discharge. In 
this case, Mr. Hammond has no grounds for a finding of 
nondischargeability under §523 (a) (3) (A). 
Section 523(a)(3)(A) excepts from discharge unscheduled debts 
unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge in time to 
file a proof of claim. Had this been an asset case, therefore, 
Hammond would not have had notice or actual knowledge of Orr' s 
bankruptcy in time to file a proof of claim. However, Orr's case 
was a no-asset case. 
Courts have consistently viewed no-asset cases differently under 
§523 (a) (3) because, in many jurisdictions, proofs of claim are 
either unnecessary or not accepted for filing. Absent a showing 
a 
of fraud or intentional omission, §523(a)(3) does not act to deny 
a debtor's discharge for not listing or scheduling a creditor in 
time to file a proof of claim. Samuel v. Baitcher, 781 F.2d 1529, 
1534 (11th Cir. 1986); Stark v. St. Mary?s Hospital, 717 F.2d 
322, 324 (7th Cir. 1983) . See also In re Beshensky, 68 B.R. 452, 
454 (Bktcy. E.D. Wis. 1987) and the cases cited therein. The 
cases reason that since a time is never set to file a proof of 
claim in a no-asset case, the creditor is not deprived of the 
opportunity to file a proof of claim within the meaning of 
§523(a) (3) . 
Therefore, absent a showing of fraud or intentional omission, 
Orr's debt to Hammond was discharged. There is no evidence that 
Orr fraudulently or intentionally listed Hammond's address 
incorrectly. 
If no proof-of-claim deadline has ever been set, § 523(a)(3)(A), 
by its own terms, is inapplicable. In re Bulbin (Gordon v. 
Bulbin), 122 Bankr. 161, 161 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990) ; In re Hunter, 
116 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990). 
The Robinson Court outlined three factors that courts must 
consider in determining whether a debtor's failure to list a 
creditor will prevent discharge of the unscheduled debt. Courts 
must examine 1) the reasons the debtor failed to list the 
creditor, 2) the amount of disruption which would likely occur, 
and 3) any prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the 
unlisted creditor in question. Although the bankruptcy court 
strictly construed the failure-to-list provision, that court made 
findings of fact that permit this Court to review the case sub 
judice in light of the three Robinson factors. 
1. Reasons For The Failure To File 
As the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have determined, a 
court should not discharge a debt under section 523(a)(3) if the 
debtor*s failure to schedule that debt was due to intentional 
design, fraud, or improper motive. Soult, 894 F.2d at 817; 
[**16] Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534; Rosinski, 759 F.2d at 541; 
Stark, 717 F.2d at 323-34. If the failure is attributable solely 
to negligence or inadvertence, however, equity points toward 
discharge of the debt. 
In this case, Orr's failure to list Mr. Hammond's correct address 
on the section 521(1) schedules was completely due to mistake or 
inadvertence. In fact, there is no evidence whatever demonstrated 
that Mr. Orr had fraudulently or intentionally failed to list Mr. 
Hammond's current address on the schedule. Hence, the first 
factor supports discharge. 
2. Disruption To The Courts 
The second factor focuses on undue disruption to courts1 dockets. 
While bankruptcy courts will certainly experience some disruption 
by allowing debtors to amend their schedules and creditors to 
submit proofs of claims outside the Rule 3002(c) time period, 
such disruption is not so inordinate as to tip the scales against 
discharging the debt. Here, Mr. Hammond has not suggested even 
one way in which the discharge can or will unduly disrupt the 
courts, and this Court finds that no such disruption would occur. 
Therefore, the second factor likewise favors discharge. 
3. Prejudice to Creditors 
Without question, the third factor, which focuses on prejudice to 
the creditors—in conjunction with the first factor—is the most 
critical. Creditors are prejudiced only if their rights to 
receive their share of dividends and obtain dischargeability 
determinations are compromised. Soult, 894 F.2d at 817; 
Rosinski, 759 F.2d at 542; see also In re Haga (Haga v. National 
Union Fire Insurance Company), 131 Bankr. 320, 326 
(Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991) (stating that "Congress apparently only 
considered [the omitted creditor!s rights to share in any 
distribution and obtain a determination of dischargeability] as 
being material because only the inability to timely file a proof 
of claim and a dischargeability action are sufficient grounds 
under the Code to penalize the debtor" (citing In re Anderson, 72 
Bankr. 783, 786 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987))). 
The Sixth Circuit explained in Rosinski that section 523(a)(3) 
applies "only if [the] failure to include the creditor on the 
original schedule can be shown to have prejudiced him in some way 
or to have been part of a scheme of fraud or intentional design." 
759 F.2d at 541; see also Soult, 894 F.2d at 817 (determining 
that bankruptcy courts may reopen cases so as to allow amendment 
11 
of schedules and discharge of debt if the "failure to schedule a 
debt was simply inadvertent and did not prejudice the creditor in 
any way"). 
No creditor has been or will be prejudiced here. Indeed, Mr. 
Hammond's rights to participate in dividends would not be any 
different had they been listed first on the schedules. 
Further, Mr. Hammond only dischargeability claim arises from the 
failure-to-list statute. There is no question but that Mr. 
Hammond has had full opportunity to develop, brief, and argue 
that claim before this Court and the district. Hence, Mr. 
Hammond7 s right to have his dischargeability claim decided has 
not been compromised in any way. Additionally, the parties have 
not suggested any way that a listed creditor's right to a 
dischargeability decision could be prejudiced here. Thus, the 
third factor, like the first and second factors, favors 
discharge. 
Because Mr. Orr's failure to list Mr. Hammond as a creditor was 
solely due to mistake or inadvertence and because Mr. Hammond was 
scheduled in time to protect his rights, section 523(a)(3)(A) is 
inapplicable here. 
Conclusion 
This court holds equitable powers to determine whether the debt 
should have been dischargeable. Under the definition embodied in 
§523 (a)(3) when there is a no-asset bankruptcy filing, such as 
this case by Mr. Orr, §523 (a)(3) does not apply. Even if Mr. 
Hammond was not given notice in time to file a proof of claim. 
However, this being a no-asset case, proof of claim would not be 
filed. 
Despite the fact that Mr. Hammond was not provided notice of the 
bankruptcy proceeding his claim was not prejudiced in anyway and 
would have been dischargeable in the bankruptcy. 
Mr. Orr's listing of Mr. Hammond at the last known address was 
reasonable and was done in good faith. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd Day of July 2002. 
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